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Article Summary: 
Peacekeeping has evolved both in its focus and in setting increasingly ambitious 
goals. In effect, the referent object of peacekeeping—what and whose peace is to be 
kept—has changed. The peace that is to be kept has evolved from a negative 
conception of peace to encompassing an increasingly positive understanding of peace. 
Similarly, the object of the peace has shifted from the global to the national and 
ultimately the local. In effect, this has raised the bar for peacekeeping. 
 
Peacekeeping research has mirrored these changes in the expectations and practice of 
peacekeeping where the (in)effectiveness of peacekeeping has remained a constant 
concern. The evaluation has shifted from the authorization and organization of 
peacekeeping missions to the impact of peacekeepers to avoid the recurrence of 
conflict, to ultimately the ability of peacekeepers to change the situation on the 
ground and the interaction between peacekeepers and the local population. 
 
Research on peacekeeping has become increasingly methodologically sophisticated. 
Originally, qualitative cases studies provided a largely critical evaluation of the effect 
of peacekeeping. Large-n quantitative studies have reassessed where peacekeepers are 
deployed and who provides peacekeepers. Controlling for selection bias and possible 
endogeneity, quantitative research finds peacekeeping makes the recurrence of 
conflict less likely. Disaggregate data on peacekeeping confirm that peacekeeping 
contains local conflict and protect local civilian population. At the same time, 
peacekeepers have only had limited success in positively affecting conflict societies 
by means of security sector reform and building state capacity. There is little evidence 
that peacekeeping is able to support democratization and economic development. 
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Introduction 
Peacekeeping inevitably has to grapple with what peace and whose peace is to be 
kept. This would seem obvious for peacekeeping research as well, but over the last 
sixty years scholars have been mainly concerned with whether peacekeeping ever 
works. For a long time, research produced a long list of prime suspects for the failures 
of peacekeeping: the politics behind the authorization of peacekeeping missions, 
limited or inappropriate mandates, insufficient resources (financially and in troop 
numbers), etc. There may even have been some ‘lessons learned’: since the end of the 
Cold War, the UN has authorized more missions deploying an unprecedented number 
of peacekeepers. So-called integrated (or complex) missions have been given broader 
mandates encompassing peacebuilding and even, if deemed necessary, robust 
peacemaking. An increasing number of countries now contribute peacekeepers both 
via the United Nations (UN) as well as regional security organizations, most 
prominently the African Union (AU), European Union (EU) and the Organization of 
American States (OAS). At the same time, controversies surrounding peacekeeping 
have hardly diminished, arguably because the ultimate objectives of peacekeeping 
remain elusive. 
 
Peacekeeping has evolved both in its focus and in setting increasingly ambitious 
goals. In effect, the referent object of peacekeeping—what and whose peace is to be 
kept—has changed. The peace that is to be kept has evolved from a negative 
conception of peace to encompassing an increasingly positive understanding of peace 
(Galtung 1964). Similarly, the object of the peace has shifted from the global to the 
national and ultimately the local. Somewhat counter intuitively, this has made the 
population of the ‘peacekept’ more inclusive. Whereas originally peacekeeping aimed 
to secure the objectives of the major powers (that is, the Permanent Five of the UN 
Security Council) and national elites, its main focus now firmly includes civilians 
caught up in the fighting and suffering the consequences of poorly governed or failed 
states. In effect, this has raised the bar for peacekeeping. The expectations of 
peacekeepers have been heightened both in response to success—‘if peacekeeping 
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works in Namibia, it should also work in Cambodia’—as well as failure—‘if 
peacekeeping failed in the DRC because of limited resources (restrictive mandate, 
etc.), it should succeed if the peacekeepers are given more resources (broader 
mandate, etc.)’. 
 
The agenda of peacekeeping research has to some extent followed these 
developments. The focus of the study of UN peacekeeping has shifted from the UN to 
peacekeeping. Originally, (comparative) case studies (Diehl, Reifschneider, and 
Hensel 1996; Durch et al. 2003; Paris 1997, 2004) examined the legal framework of 
peacekeeping and the management of peacekeeping operations. The international 
(UN) level provided the core criteria for success: were missions mandated and 
deployed in time? Was there sufficient financial and troop support? Initial systemic 
quantitative studies (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Fortna 2003, 2004, 2008a, 
2008b) compared peacekeeping missions to evaluate their relative success or failure, 
where success is defined at the theatre of operations: do peacekeeping operations 
make it less likely that former combatants return to fighting? They defined durable 
peace as the absence of armed conflict. In effect, peacekeeping ‘works’ if it 
contributes to a negative peace, where peace does not have a specific content, but 
signifies a situation without battle related deaths.  
 
Recently, research on peacekeeping has definitely gone ‘micro’. The experiences of 
the local population and the (in)ability of peacekeepers to address their urgent 
concerns have become main topics for research. Accordingly, the core research 
question no longer focuses on the absence of conflict, but on the impact of 
peacekeeping on the content and quality of peace, the so-called positive peace.  
Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2013, 2014) show that peacekeepers protect 
civilians against one-side violence highlighting the increasingly humanitarian role of 
peacekeepers. Increasing availability of data with detailed information on deployment 
and activities of peacekeepers has encouraged researchers to examine their impact 
sub-nationally. Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis (2016a, 2016b) show that robust 
peacekeeping limits the conflict episodes in specific localities, while Gleditsch and 
Beardsley (2015) demonstrate how peacekeeping avoids conflict from engulfing 
countries. Fieldwork and field experiments use increasingly sophisticated research 
designs to address concerns of peacekeeping and the ‘peacekept’ directly (Fortna 
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2008b; Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii 2014, Gilligan et al. 2012; Mvukiyehe and Samii 
2012). Ethnographic research (Autesserre 2010, 2014) details peacekeeping practices 
and their failure to secure peace from the bottom-up.  In this way research has not 
only clearly expanded the population of ‘peacekept’, but also use a positive peace—
the improvement of human, political and economic rights—as the yardstick for 
peacekeeping success. 
 
The remainder of the chapter explores four main themes. The next section considers 
in greater detail how the evolution of peacekeeping and increasing expectations for 
the UN to produce both negative and positive peace have shaped the research agenda. 
Section three reviews the selection of peacekeeping missions and the supply of 
peacekeepers, while section four considers the findings of quantitative comparative 
research on the effectiveness of peacekeeping; in other words, the quality of the peace 
that is kept. In section five, we provide an overview of the recent literature on the 
local experiences of the ‘peacekept’. The conclusions revisit the main theme, namely 
that research on peacekeeping has steadily increased the standard and expectations for 
defining successful peacekeeping. 
 
Evolution of Peacekeeping from Negative to Positive Peace 
Originally peacekeeping described observer missions mandated to maintain a truce or 
cease-fire agreement by keeping the belligerents (usually states) apart. UN 
peacekeeping built upon the experiences of the League of Nations. Reflecting the 
post-World War II world, it was not intended as a substitute for sovereignty and 
limited to address shared concerns of the main global powers; hence the decisive role 
of the P-5 in mandating peacekeeping missions (Barash and Webel 2002: 351). 
During the Cold War the UN deployed only a small number of UN peacekeeping 
missions, commonly described as ‘first generation’ or ‘traditional’ peacekeeping 
missions with an emphasis on impartiality, light armament and peacekeeping by 
consent (Goulding 1993). The scope of the UN missions was narrow with a focus on 
monitoring the terms of peace agreements between sovereign states (for example 
Israel-Syria in the Golan Heights; India-Pakistan in Kashmir). Yet several of these 
missions have proved to be remarkably long-lived; for example, United Nations 
Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in Kashmir has been 
deployed since 1949. The UN operation in Congo (ONUC) in 1960 was the first time 
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the UN attempted at peacekeeping in an intrastate conflict. It was generally 
considered as a failure, which further restricted the willingness of the UN to engage in 
peacekeeping. For the next thirty years, the UN mandated only a few small missions 
for a short period, such as the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General 
in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP), and the longer but very small deployment to 
Cyprus (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus-UNFICYP). Generally a few small and 
neutral countries such as Sweden and the Fiji Islands provided the majority of 
peacekeepers.  
 
The end of the Cold War not only changed the nature of international conflict and 
threats to international security, but also increased the space for cooperation among 
the permanent members of the Security Council (P-5). New security threats affected 
the nature of peacekeeping missions (Chesterman 2005; Diehl and Balas 2014; Doyle 
and Sambanis 2006). In the 1990s the erosion of state legitimacy emerged as a 
primary threat to state, regional and even global security. In the aftermath of conflict, 
the absence of central and competent state authority not only undermines the 
prospects for peace. It also destabilizes the political situation in the region (Duffield 
2014; Migdal 1998; Nixon 2006; Rotberg 2002). In response, UN missions slowly 
transformed in order to substitute for the lack of state capacity and to improve 
governance (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). There was a dramatic surge in both number 
of missions but also size of missions in terms of personnel. In a very short period 
from 1989 to 1994, the UN Security Council authorized 20 new missions increasing 
the number of peacekeepers from 11000 to 75000. So-called ‘second’ and ‘third’-
generation peacekeeping missions replaced the ‘traditional’ model of peacekeeping 
(Goulding 1993). Third-generation missions moved beyond observational tasks to 
complex ‘multidimensional and integrative missions’ with more ambitious goals to 
promote complex peace agreements and to sustain peace in the post-conflict period 
(Tiernay 2015).  
 
After the Brahimi report (2000), peacebuilding became a primary focus of UN 
peacekeeping. The more comprehensive agenda of peacekeeping includes 
humanitarian assistance, disarmament and re-integration of combatants (DDR), 
security sector reform (SSR), promoting human rights and reestablishment of rule-of-
law, organizing democratic elections and supporting economic development and 
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social justice (Boutros-Ghali 1992; UN DPKO 2008, 2006). Supporting the provision 
of humanitarian aid and the protection of civilians became further core aims of 
peacekeeping. Integrative or multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operations have 
even begun to pay some attention to improve governance at the community level.  
 
Researchers developed new typologies of UN missions to account for the variations in 
the scope and mandates of missions. For example, Ratner (1996) identifies several 
criteria to distinguish ‘new’ from ‘traditional’ peacekeeping. Also Diehl and Balas 
(2014) suggest classifying UN missions based on core tasks and practices in order to 
provide a relevant framework to evaluate their success. Scholars have also observed 
that missions tend to mutate and transform. Often in response to changing ground 
conditions, the UN regularly expands mission mandates, redefining their goals and 
modifying their tasks (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2010; Talentino 2004). Howard 
(2008) concludes, however, that the ability of the UN to adapt to changing conditions 
on the ground and to learn from mistakes is largely limited within missions, while 
mistakes are repeated across missions.  Interestingly, Howard’s (2008) study can be 
regarded as a transition period in research where the focus shifted away from internal 
UN politics to the experience of UN peacekeeping missions in the field. 
 
Providing Peacekeepers 
The expansion of peacekeeping both in terms of breath and scope has led to new 
research questions and debates on the nature and aims of such missions. In particular, 
quantitative comparative research has become increasingly important as a 
methodological approach but also in terms of theory development. It has been 
especially successful in challenging common perceptions on where peacekeepers are 
deployed and whose interests are served. 
 
The common perception in the public but also among policy makers is that 
peacekeeping missions deploy in the so-called easy cases, while they avoid difficult, 
controversial conflicts. A similar line of criticism is that UN missions primarily 
reflect the national interests of the P-5. Both arguments reflect a rather pessimistic 
view on the role of the UN in managing global peace. Yet empirical research suggests 
that the UN peacekeeping missions neither focus on easy cases nor merely promote 
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neo-liberal interests. In effect, the answer to the question ‘whose peace is kept’ has 
become increasingly complex.  
 
Large-n quantitative research suggests that, if anything, UN missions intervene in so-
called ‘hard’ cases (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Fortna 2004, 2008b; Hultman 2010). 
Peacekeepers are predominantly deployed to countries with a lack of governance 
capacity. Here the task for building a stable peace is rendered difficult as democracy 
and stable institutions are in short supply and the legacy of war includes large number 
of civilian casualties (Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2016a). Recent evaluations of 
the effectiveness of peacekeeping recognize that this makes it more challenging for 
the UN to generate successful outcomes (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Gilligan and 
Sergenti 2008; Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård 2010, Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 
2016b). 
 
Regarding the specific mandates of missions, research suggests that humanitarian 
concerns and the severity of conflict often motivate decisions of the Security Council. 
In one of the first systematic studies of possible bias in UN peacekeeping, Gilligan 
and Stedman (2003: 38) report conflict severity, measured in terms of causalities, as 
the key factor for intervention. Humanitarian and security concerns mainly motivate 
UN operations, but at least in the period directly following the end of the Cold War 
there may have been a regional bias in favor of Europe and the western hemisphere. 
Fortna and de Jonge Oudraat similarly argue that the UN tends to intervene in more 
severe conflicts (Fortna 2004, 2008a, 2008b; de Jonge Oudraat 1996). Beardsley and 
Schmidt (2012) examine 210 international crises from 1945-2002 and find that 
although the overlap or conflict of national interests of the five permanent members of 
the Security Council indeed influences and constraints the ability of the UN to act in 
international crises, the severity of conflicts remains a more important predictor of 
UN intervention. Benson and Kathman (2014) offer a similarly nuanced explanation 
of when the UN deploys peacekeepers in a civil conflict. By looking at the UN 
Security Council (UNSC) resolutions on African civil wars in the period 1990-2008, 
they find that the resolutions reflect a bias towards the war outcome; i.e., forces are 
more likely to be deployed when the side that the UNSC members favor is 
experiencing heavy losses. At the same time, even recognizing possible bias in where 
UN forces are deployed, they also note that the willingness to protect civilians and 
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end hostilities is an important element of the calculus to intervene. Allen and Yuen 
(2014) also link the flexibility of the mandate and operational latitude of a mission to 
the interests of the P-5 members and their links with war-torn societies.  
 
Of course, even if the UN intervenes in more violent or difficult conflicts, countries 
that contribute peacekeepers could still be concerned about the welfare of their troops 
and limit where and how they are deployed. Peacekeepers may end up in relatively 
safe areas with reliable infrastructure close to their headquarters and major urban 
areas (Autesserre 2008, 2010). Using disaggregate data, recent research has looked at 
the factors behind UN deployment at the sub-national level (Costalli 2014; Diehl 
2014; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2015; Powers, Reeder, and Townsen 2015; 
Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2016a). Costalli (2014) studies sub-national variation 
in the presence of UN peacekeepers in Bosnia and highlights that UN tends to be 
active where there was high level of violence against civilians. Ruggeri, Dorussen, 
and Gizelis (2016a), also using data on conflict and peacekeeping deployment at the 
grid level, find that peacekeepers tend to be deployed in areas of conflict but with a 
significant lag of roughly two years. Moreover, for large countries like the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) accessibility to urban areas influences the 
pattern of deployment in conflict regions.   
 
Regardless, countries subject to peacekeeping missions overwhelmingly belong to the 
‘global south’ as critical theorists rightly highlight and problematize (Wyeth 2012). 
Critics of the liberal peace (e.g., Paris 2002) argue that most international 
organizations internalize the political and economic values of the wealthy liberal 
democracies while nearly all of the countries hosting peacebuilding missions are poor 
and politically weak. Peacebuilding becomes a project to bring war-shattered states 
into line with prevailing international standards that define how states should organize 
themselves (Chandler 2004; Joshi, Lee, and MacGinty 2014; Paris 2002: 638).  
 
Whereas the wealthy liberal democracies still carry the largest financial burden of 
peacekeepers (Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 1999), they are no longer the main 
contributors on peacekeeping personnel. Historically, neutral countries like Sweden 
used to provide the bulk of troops to the small and neutral peacekeeping missions. A 
much larger group of countries has been needed to meet the growth in demand for 
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peacekeepers since the 1990s, and increasingly countries that belong to the ‘global 
south’ provide the bulk of peacekeeping personnel (Bove and Elia 2011). As of April 
2015 the UN missions include 107565 uniformed personnel –uniformed personnel 
includes troops, police forces and military observers—from 121 countries. The top 5 
contributors are Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Ethiopia and Rwanda, while China is 
among the top 10 contributors.  
 
The composition of UN peacekeeping missions has raised questions about the 
effectiveness of missions (Bove and Ruggeri 2015; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; 
Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013), the pattern of deployment of UN forces 
(Fortna 2008a, 2008b), but also the politics of burden sharing (Cunliffe 2013; 
Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu 2009; Gaibulloev et al. 2015; Shimizu and Sandler 
2002, 2010). Ward and Dorussen (2016) demonstrate countries with similar policy 
preferences—as demonstrated in their voting behavior in the UN General Assemby—
are more likely to contribute troops to particular missions. The current model of 
peacekeepers’ provision has however led to debates on the sustainability of missions 
and on how to provide incentives to participating countries given the exceeding 
demands for larger missions of more than 12,000 uniformed personnel (Bellamy and 
Williams 2013; Coleman 2014).  
 
The differences between the countries that finance UN missions and the countries that 
consistently contribute troops have raised questions about the aims of peacekeeping 
missions. Cunliffe (2013) argues that, in its current form of financing, cosmopolitan 
UN peacekeeping represents liberal imperialism. He compares modern peacekeepers 
to the ‘sepoy’ forces of the Indian army or the ‘askari’ of the African colonial armies. 
The peacekeepers from the ‘global south’ in effect secure and protect the interests of 
the powerful Northern countries that dominate the UN Security Council. Whereas 
Gaibulloev et al. (2015) argue that the remuneration of peacekeeping forces leads to 
donor-specific benefits for contributing countries, and thus represents a redistribution 
of resources from developed to developing countries, Cunliffe warns that the 
specialization of Southern governments in providing peacekeepers undermines their 
democratic institutions because the military’s elevation in such prominent role 
threatens the democratic polity (Cunliffe 2013: 212).  
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Victor’s (2010) study on African contributors of troops shows that, at least in the case 
of regional missions, poorer countries with lower state legitimacy tend to participate 
more often in regional peacekeeping. Regional peacekeeping, however, also poses an 
important challenge to critical studies, since in the cases of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) and the African Union (AU) peacekeeping is not a further 
example of Northern ‘liberal imperialism’.  The divergent approaches to 
peacekeeping between empirical research and critical theory are also pronounced with 
respect to quality of the peace that peacekeeping missions provide.  
 
 
The Effectiveness of Peacekeeping 
A number of case studies (e.g., Clarke and Herbst 1997; Durch 1996; Durch et al. 
2003; Paris 2004; Weiss 1995) were published in the aftermath of two tragic incidents 
in the history of peacekeeping: the spectacular failure of the United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda to prevent or even minimize the magnitude of the 
Rwanda genocide and the ineffective missions in Somalia (UNITAF and UNOSOM I 
and II). Understandably, these studies highlighted the failures of peacekeeping 
emphasizing how shifting situations on the ground left UN peacekeepers with 
inappropriate mandates and insufficient capacity to intervene effectively. While 
emphasis was on the organizational capacity of peacekeeping, there was less 
understanding of the changing nature of global patterns of conflict and the challenges 
that the predominance of intrastate conflicts presented for UN peacekeeping and 
missions.  The meaning of peace in the context of intrastate conflicts had 
fundamentally altered, and so did the expectations of what constitutes an effective 
peacekeeping mission.  
 
Since 2000s there have been two major changes in the study of peacekeeping. The 
seminal Doyle and Sambanis study in 2000 introduced the use of quantitative 
methods in the analysis of peacekeeping. The use of quantitative methods mirrored 
methodological and epistemological changes in the study of conflict, especially civil 
and intrastate wars. The proliferation of new datasets such as the Uppsala/PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002) and most recent development of the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) among others allowed researchers to develop 
more comprehensive theoretical and empirical models of assessing the performance 
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of UN missions in containing or ending violent armed conflict. Simultaneously, study 
of Doyle and Sambanis was indicative of a theoretical shift where the interactions 
between the UN peacekeepers and the local actors (either the government or 
populations) were recognized as important in understanding the impact of UN 
missions on conflict management and resolution. Doyle and Sambanis developed a 
more comprehensive theoretical model of not just peacekeeping but also 
peacebuilding, where external actors supplement the local capacity highlighting the 
role of ‘peacekept’ in the process (Fortna 2008b; Dorussen 2015). 
 
The findings of initial systematic and quantitative comparative studies showed that 
UN peacekeeping can be an effective method of conflict management. Quantitative 
studies almost invariably find that peacekeeping reduces the likelihood of conflict 
recurrence (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006).  Fortna (2003, 2004, 2008a, 2008b); 
Gilligan and Sergenti (2008); Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård (2011); and Sambanis and 
Doyle (2007) have shown that the impact of peacekeeping is not simply a matter of 
selection bias:  if anything, the UN selects ‘hard’ cases – civil conflicts with high 
casualty levels that have been on-going and incompletely settled – making the record 
of peacekeeping even more remarkable. Most studies control for possible selection 
bias via matching methods, however recently, Ijaz (2014) proposes the supply of 
peacekeepers and Vivalt  (2015) the rotation within the UN Security Council as 
instruments for the non-random assignment of peacekeeping. 
 
The quantitative literature identifies several mechanisms through which peackeeping 
missions influence the likelihood of peace in a post-conflict country. Doyle and 
Sambanis (2006) link the impact of peacekeepers to the broader agenda of new 
peacekeeping. The comparative advantage of UN missions is not the use of force, but 
rather the ability to mediate and implement comprehensive peace agreements. Fortna 
(2008b), building on the civil war literature that conceptualizes armed conflict as 
bargaining failure, argues that peacekeeping can increase the likelihood of peace by 
reducing uncertainty between the fighting parties. Peacekeeping facilitates the flow of 
information and increase the credibility of any commitments made by warring parties; 
for example, by means of dealing with potential spoilers. In one of the few studies 
that compare UN missions to regional non-UN peacekeeping, Heldt (2004) finds only 
minor differences between the effectiveness of UN and non-UN peacekeeping. Yet, 
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he points out that UN peacekeeping remains the most comprehensive instrument of 
the international community for peacebuilding. Recent research explores the 
complementarities between UN and regional organizations with elements of resource 
pooling to support complex missions (Brosig 2014).  
 
The findings of quantitative research sharply contrast with the conclusions reached by 
most qualitative case studies and ethno-graphic research. Radically different 
conceptualization of peace and effectiveness can to some extent explain the opposing 
conclusions. Qualitative and ethno-graphic research offers a more pessimistic view on 
the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions to keep the peace not only because it 
applies more comprehensive and demanding definition of effectiveness but also 
because it considers experiences at the local and the micro-level rather than at the 
level of the country or the mission. Peace becomes a multilevel concept separate from 
war rather than the mere absence of armed conflict (Olsson 2009; Olsson and Gizelis 
2014). The conceptualization of peace as ‘positive’ raises the questions of who 
benefits from peace and what does peace mean for different groups within a country, 
in other words peace for whom?  In other cases researchers conceptualize ‘peace’ as a 
process leading to questions of who is providing ‘peace’ (Barnett, Fang, and Zürcher 
2014; Paris and Sisk 2009; Pouligny 2006).  Thus, the concept of peace is linked to 
the experiences and perceptions the local populations or ‘peacekept’ as we examine in 
the next section.   
 
The broader liberal governance agenda has also become an object of criticism. 
Critical studies theorize peacekeeping as an instrument of the international 
community to impose global (i.e., Western) values and norms on ‘weak’ countries 
(Barnett 1995; Gibbs 1997; Jakobsen 1996; Joshi, Lee and MacGinty 2014; Ignatieff 
2003; Richmond 2014). Weinstein (2005) and Herbst (2003) have questioned whether 
external intervention can ever succeed at peace- and statebuilding, and instead argue 
for endogenously supported processes. Roland Paris (1997, 2004) discusses the limits 
of the liberal democratic peace for post-conflict countries with historically weak states. 
He argues that true legacy of peace-building is often little more than giving quasi- 
authoritarian leaders an opportunity to hold on to power via quasi-democratic elections.  
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When the concept of peace is expanded to include multiple dimensions then 
peacekeeping operations are often seen as dysfunctional and ineffective (Cambell, 
Chandler, and Sabratham 2011). There are serious concerns about the quality of 
peacekeepers provided. The limited willingness of countries that have sent 
peacekeepers to accept casualties compounds the lack of interest by major powers to 
sustain peacekeeping missions. Inter-organizational communication is slow and 
regularly fails to deliver the support needed on the ground. Autesserre’s (2010, 2014) 
narratives of the organizational biases within the United Nations Mission in Congo 
(MONUC) further illustrate the impact that dominant cultures within the organization 
have on the mission’s effectiveness to address local conflicts (also see Moore 2013).    
Recent methodological developments in the study of civil wars allow researchers to 
use data that vary across time and space at different levels of analysis. As a result, 
quantitative researchers have started exploring local variations in order to assess the 
capacity of peacekeeping missions to contain conflict and save lives. While the 
definition of ‘peace’ remains quite minimalist, the high level of granularity of the data 
allow for studies to answer basic questions on the effectiveness of peacekeeping. The 
current studies converge on the key findings that UN peacekeeping reduces the 
duration of conflict in a particular location, contains the space of armed conflict, and 
protects civilians (Beardsley 2011; Gleditsch and Beardsley 2015; Hultman, 
Kathman, and Shannon 2013, 2014; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2016b). Regional 
(sub-national) variations in local capacities can explain variation in outcomes in the 
performance of peacekeeping operations and from within country comparisons a 
nuanced picture emerges of how the local interacts with the global (Gizelis 2011).  
 
What about the ‘Peacekept’? 
Whereas traditional peacekeeping represents a top-down approach clearly aimed at 
encouraging political leaders to honor the terms of peace agreements, comprehensive 
peacekeeping also encompasses bottom-up approaches and recognizes the valuable 
contributions to be made locally at the grassroots level. Peacekeepers often have a 
very limited understanding of local conditions and (unsurprisingly given the need of a 
small number of peacekeepers to control a large area) limited presence on the ground 
(Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2016a). A further complaint is the frequent rotation 
of peacekeepers (Autesserre 2010). Pouligny (2006) highlights the big difference 
between the official version of peacekeeping and local sentiments. Similarly, 
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Dorussen (2015) found in Timor Leste that the official version of peacekeepers 
building capacity of local policemen to differ markedly from the local version in 
which peacekeepers are good ‘taxi-drivers’ with off-roaders that can take you 
anywhere and good at fixing computers. Furthermore, critical international relations 
scholars observe that the more recent emphasis on regional peacekeeping runs the risk 
of a divergence between low (mainly African) and high (Western) quality of 
peacekeeping (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2010). 
 
The literature on peacekeeping at the micro level has to deal with a number of 
challenges. Firstly, it needs to be established who are the key actors in keeping peace. 
Especially in a post-conflict environment, governments tend to be weak with limited 
control over its population and territory. Rebel groups regularly participate in peace 
negotiations and sign peace agreements, but little is known about their organizational 
structures and their potential role in a post-conflict environment. Approaches that 
focus on the society level emphasize the role of local communities and civil society 
organizations in interacting with the central government or with external actors and 
international organizations (Dorussen and Gizelis 2013; Gizelis 2009, 2011; Ruggeri, 
Dorussen, and Gizelis 2013). Expanding the set of relevant actors also broadens the 
definition of peace, since different actors will have different expectations about what 
peace is for them. Research on peacekeeping at the micro-level has to consider what, 
if any, the implications are for how to conceptualize and measure peace. Importantly, 
different definitions of peace may imply different expectations on how local actors 
respond to peacekeeping missions (da Costa and Karlsrud 2014). 
 
The diverse conceptualization of peace is a key dividing line between empirical 
quantitative research and critical studies, as well as qualitative single cases. In 
quantitative research ‘peace’ does not have a specific content, but rather it signifies 
the absence of violent conflict. In this research tradition, the longevity of peace is of 
interest and the key milestone to evaluate the performance and effectiveness of a 
mission (Olsson and Gizelis 2014). The content or the quality of peace, however, 
brings forward questions about institutional formation, governance, and ultimately the 
nature of societies and states that emerge through interaction with external actors 
(Bieber 2005; Barnett, Fang, and Zürcher 2014). In a similar line of research, feminist 
theorists have highlighted the importance of the quality of peace for women in 
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particular. Olsson (2009) outlined the different implications of peacekeeping and 
post-conflict reconstruction for the security and political participation of men and 
women.  While feminist theorists have historically dominated research on gender and 
peacekeeping, more recent empirical research has attempted to further integrate 
gender into mainstream research on peacekeeping (Gizelis and Olsson 2015; Olsson 
and Gizelis 2014; Olsson and Tryggestad 2001). Gendering peacekeeping becomes 
particularly salient for security sector reform and political participation signifying 
new areas of theoretical development to improve our understanding of peacekeeping 
effectiveness (Gizelis and Olsson 2015; Karim and Beardsley 2013).  
 
Bottom-up approaches not only emphasize the importance of local non-governmental 
and grassroots organizations in reconstruction (Lederach 2008), but also their role in 
sustaining (and undermining) peace processes. Peacebuilding policies emphasize the 
importance of local dialogue and capacity-building, and appeal to local actors; yet 
they do so through an international template that is overly technical, depoliticizing, 
and often exclusionary (Paris 2002). Influential reports, such as Annan’s (2005) 
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, promote 
the idea that the UN system dealing with a very different international system requires 
a new governance-based approach promoting partnerships and local ownership. This 
approach to peacebuilding seeks to strengthen individual, local and national 
capacities, building institutions, instigating good governance and enhancing economic 
opportunities. International organizations, governments, and INGOs have adopted a 
discourse of capacity building that places more emphasis on local institutions and 
civil society. Significantly, this highlights the need for good governance to address 
failures in reconstruction and development as the result of poor institutions and weak 
capacity. The governance dimension is essential to let people use their power and 
resources to maximum effect.  
 
In contrast, top-down peacebuilding approaches tend to focus on elites and 
establishing functioning institutions in a country after violent conflict (Donais 2012; 
Paris 1997). Local civil societies and grassroots organizations are generally seen as 
fragmented, weak, and lacking capacity to fully participate and engage with the 
peacekeeping and, ultimately, peacebuilding process (Lefranc 2013; Pouligny 2006). 
At the same time, the literature on peacebuilding commonly attributes failures in post-
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conflict reconstruction to the top-down imposition of policies and values on local 
populations (Autesserre 2014; Paris and Sisk 2009). 
 
While initially only qualitative empirical researchers focused on grassroots 
organizations, increasingly quantitative studies move beyond the central government 
and the rebels as key actors and explore non-state actors and their role in 
peacekeeping (Dorussen and Gizelis 2013). The findings are often mixed. Autesserre 
(2008, 2010), Pouligny (2006) and others such as Richmond (2014) and Basini (2013) 
are highly critical of the failures of peacekeeping missions to integrate local actors in 
the peacebuilding processes. Peacekeepers often have a very limited understanding of 
local conditions and often only limited presence on the ground. This is attributed to 
the structures of the missions, the rotation of peacekeepers and organizational 
employees, organizational failures, and finally ideological perspectives that limit the 
ability of understanding local conditions (Autesserre 2010; Diehl and Druckman 
2010) Limited experimental evidence and semi-structured interviews, however, offer 
an interesting nuance on how different populations among locals perceive the UN 
missions suggesting that among local populations, women and vulnerable groups tend 
to be more positive towards UN peacekeeping missions rather than men or local elites 
(Dorussen 2015; Olsson and Gizelis 2014). 
 
Critical and qualitative researchers who examine the synergies between local actors 
both elites, but also at the grassroots level, have highlighted the emergence of ‘hybrid 
peace governance’ in post conflict countries that experience peacebuilding missions 
(Belloni 2012; Bjorkdahl and Hoglund 2013; MacGinty 2008, 2010; Millar, van der 
Lijn and Verkoren 2013; Richmond and Mitchell 2013). The authors on ‘hybrid 
peace’ are primarily concerned with the characteristics of ‘peace’ that emerges in the 
wake of peacekeeping operations. 
 
Conclusions 
UN peacekeeping missions have evolved from the small missions of barely 300 
personnel in the wake of WWII to the large comprehensive missions with more than 
15,000 military personnel and complex mandates.  In practice, peacekeepers are now 
deployed into more challenging situations that involve complex protracted conflicts. 
They are also given broader and more challenging mandates to complete a wide range 
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of tasks involving local actors both at the elite and the grassroots levels. Given the 
complexity of contemporary missions, we may have expected peacekeeping to fail 
more often. And yet, existing research suggests that despite limitations and 
challenges, UN missions often are successful in saving lives. 
 
Research has mirrored the transformation of the UN missions and established new 
and higher standards to measure the effectiveness and success of peacekeeping.  
Effective missions should not only provide negative peace by stopping conflict and 
sustain the post-agreement duration of peace, but also positive peace. The concept of 
positive peace expands to include the protection of civilians and vulnerable groups of 
people from residual violence, security sector reform, building state capacity and even 
support democratization and economic development.  Adding to the increasing long 
list of expectations of building societies, UN missions are often expected to monitor 
borders, improve stability in conflict ‘hot spots’ and deter ‘spoilers’ from challenging 
the national peace agreements.  
 
In light of the increased expectations of what constitutes a successful UN 
peacekeeping mission, any positive findings from both quantitative and qualitative 
research are actually quite remarkable (Goldstein 2011). The conventional wisdom is 
that UN peacekeeping is ineffective, yet the review of the existing literature suggests 
that we not only demand more and more from the blue helmets, but that peacekeepers 
actually often deliver beyond expectations.  Future research needs to highlight the 
baseline against which UN peacekeeping missions can be benchmarked for a more 
realistic perspective on peacekeeping to emerge among academics, policy makers, 
and the public opinion.  
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